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Abstract This paper studies the role of middlemen in open-access fisheries and how the 
organization of the supply chains affects resource exploitation and the level and distribution 
of economic rent. Imperfect competition among middlemen can help ensure that fish stocks 
are not depleted, as in the case of open-access fisheries and competitive markets. This also 
induce higher economic rent for the supply chain in total, from a fish price increase in the 
final market. The supply chains of inshore anchovy and offshore skipjack tuna fisheries in 
Vietnam are used as empirical examples. The results show that there is neither oligopsonistic 
nor monopsonistic power for the middlemen and that the anchovy stock is being 
overexploited. For the offshore skipjack tuna case, middlemen has oligopsony power in the 
negotiation and the stock is proved to be lower than the level that produces the maximum 
sustainable yield.   
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Introduction 
In many developing countries, fisheries play a vital role in providing income, food and 
employment. However, the authorities have often little control over the activities. Due to high 
population growth and few alternative employment opportunities for the fishing population, 
this has resulted in overfishing in many coastal and ocean areas. The fishery is frequently of 
the open-access type, and the management problems can be traced back to Garrett Hardin’s 
(1968) famous allegory of ‘the tragedy of the commons’. In this paper, we draw attention to 
the organization of the fisheries supply chains in general and to the role of middlemen in 
particular, and we demonstrate that under certain conditions the presence of middlemen may 
reduce the degree of overfishing and contribute to economic rent creation. 
Various solutions to the open-access fisheries problems have been proposed to 
remedy the market and management failure. One solution has emphasized the need for 
government regulation. To manage the resources, the authorities more or less have to define 
and enforce rules regarding participation, effort use, where and when fishing can take place, 
and how much can be fished. Taxes can be a part of the solution (Flaaten and Schulz, 2010, 
Flaaten, 2018). Another solution has been to introduce private property rights to fishing 
quotas. It is argued that by privatizing rights and making them transferable (ITQ’s), 
incentives for overfishing will be removed (Hannesson, 2000). A third solution favors co-
management, which implies that different stakeholders should take a joint responsibility for 
managing the resources (Ostrom, 1990).  
All three solutions can be difficult to implement, especially in developing countries. 
The governments may lack resources and capacity to set science-based quotas and to 
introduce effective measures to regulate fishing. Market-based solutions, such as fishing 
rights being auctioned off, also require significant monitoring, control and enforcement, and 
the social costs can be prohibitive high. Similarly, co-management rests on many institutional 
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preconditions that are not present everywhere (Ostrom, 1990; 2009). This raises the question 
of whether there are other mechanisms that may contribute to sustainable development and 
combine the goals of resource conservation, economic efficiency and social equity.  
It is well known that middlemen abound in the fish trade in many developing 
countries. Their efficiency and social role has been discussed for decades, and the opinions 
diverge.  Some regard middlemen as purely exploitative and maintain that by bypassing the 
middlemen, the leakage of benefit would be reduced along the supply chain (Masters, 2008; 
Frandsen et al., 2009). Others point out that middlemen are indispensable and perform 
important functions, including selling fish to the processing industry, grading or processing 
fish themselves, and selling to the world market (Crona et al., 2010; Arya et al., 2015). 
Additionally, the middlemen reduce the time and effort needed by fishermen to marketing 
their products. In fact, the fishermen often cannot perform these tasks on their own due to 
limited education and knowledge in the fields of trade and negotiation. The fishermen may 
also rely on financial guarantees provided by the middlemen during fishing periods, notably 
in periods with low catches.  
While acknowledging these functions, others again emphasize the power asymmetry 
between fishermen and middlemen. The fishermen offer a perishable good, and they have 
few alternative outlets. They also have limited information about prices, and they often have 
to accept the price offered by the buyers. Hence, the middlemen can strongly influence the 
ex-vessel price, the price that fishermen receive when selling their harvest, and the price in 
the downstream markets tends to be defined by the price in the upstream markets. Few 
studies, however, have elaborated on these relationships and analyzed the effects of market 
structure on resource exploitation and economic rent in fisheries (WTO, 2010).  
  In this paper, we take a new look at the role of middlemen as the intermediaries in 
the fisheries supply chains. What are the economic and biological effects of middlemen in the 
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supply chains? Given that a first best solution may be unattainable, can the presence of 
middlemen with market power be a second best solution that may help to achieve a more 
sustainable management? According to second-best theory, a correction of a market 
imperfection in one area does not necessarily lead to an improvement in efficiency at the 
global level (Kronbak et al., 2014). For example, by removing the imperfection associated 
with the market power of middlemen, which hampers competition in the value chain, the 
fishing pressure might be increased. This indicates that it is necessary to study the situation 
and the implications of various measures more in detail. The role of middlemen is seldom 
accounted for in fisheries governance in developing countries. Three classical studies that 
discuss the linkage harvesting-processing sectors (Crutchfield and Pontecorvo, 1969; Clark 
and Munro, 1980; Schworm, 1983) all argue that monopsonistic processors may improve 
efficency of the utilization of a common pool resource. In this paper, we take the analysis one 
step further by explicitly incorporating the middlemen into the open-access model. The 
theoretical discussion considers various market structures in the intermediary level 
(competitive, oligopsony and monopsony), and also includes heterogeneous fishermen in the 
harvesting sector. Two case studies from Vietnam illustrate and confront the theoretical 
discussion.  
The findings of the paper demonstrate that middlemen with market power can help 
protect marine resources from depletion by implicitly “taxing” the harvest, leading to lower 
ex-vessel price. Therefore, the problem of open-access fisheries, attracting too much fishing 
effort and dissipating resource rent, may be avoided, fully or partly, when middlemen with 
market power is included in the analysis. It transpires that intervention by the government is 
necessary only if this market power is too weak or too strong. The former may lead to 
excessive effort and the latter to underutilization of the fishery resources.  
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First, we formulates a basic 
model of the relationship between the final market price and the ex-vessel price, taking into 
account the degree of market power among middlemen. Next, the effects on the ex-vessel 
price, fish stock, and rents of fishermen and middlemen in the supply chain of a price change 
in the final market are analyzed. In following section, the theoretical findings are applied to 
two cases – the offshore skipjack tuna international (Thunnus albacares) and the inshore 
anchovy domestic (Stolephorus commersonnii, Stolephorus tri, Stolephorus indicus) supply 
chains in Vietnam. Finally, the main findings are discussed and summarized. 
 
The basic model 
The supply chain model links the final fish market and the ex-vessel market. Focusing on the 
export supply chain of developing countries, there are essentially three market segments that 
define this supply chain: the first stage market, the intermediary market, and the final stage 
market. Within this conceptualization, middlemen receive the final market price for the fish 
and then offer an ex-vessel price to fishermen. Thus, affected by the final market they are 
both part of an integrated chain of economic functions and linkages across geographic 
boundaries (Gudmundsson et al., 2006; Nielsen, 2006). The economic interests of fishermen 
and middlemen may differ, but ultimately their income depends on the consumers’ 
willingness to pay for the fish. In this paper, the point of departure is a pure open-access 
fishery, which is common in many developing countries. Vessels are, by assumption, 
heterogeneous, as this is typical in most fisheries, and vessels may vary with respect to labour 
use and technological characteristics, such as size, engine power, and gear-type (Flaaten, 
2018).  
In what follows, the natural growth of the fish stock is given by the peak-valued 
Gompertz-Fox function. This model also yields a shape similar to the backward bending 
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curve in fisheries (Thuy and Flaaten, 2013), and thus helps link fisheries trade and fish stock. 
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where X is stock (measured as biomass), r is the intrinsic growth rate and K is the carrying 
capacity. The harvest is given by the standard Schaefer function:   
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with E  as fishing effort, and q as the productivity (‘catchability’) coefficient. In biological 





  ,          (3)  






. With P as the ex-vessel price of raw fish, the total revenue is: 
𝑇𝑅(𝐸) = 𝑃(𝐻)𝐻 = 𝑃(𝐻)𝑞𝐸𝑋. 
Vessels are heterogeneous and we assume the aggregate cost function is increasing and 
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where 𝛾 is the marginal cost of effort parameter. In bioeconomic equilibrium under open-
access, the average revenue of effort equals the marginal cost of effort, 𝐴𝑅(𝐸) = 𝑀𝐶(𝐸) 
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 ( MSYX ; the maximum sustainable yield stock). 




Eq. (5) can be used to discuss the linkage between prices and biological effects from 
the fisheries trade. Prices might also affect fishermen’s behaviour and hence their harvesting 
strategies. Therefore, it is true to say that Eq. (5) implicitly expresses the meaning of the 
supply backward bending curve in fisheries introduced by Copes (1970) (see Figure 1). In the 
short run, the supply of fish increases associated with the price, but in the long run which is 
the focus of this paper, it is constrained by the limited growth of the stock. If the fish price is 
“low”, the incentive to fish is weak, few fish are caught, and the fish population is abundant 
and near its carrying capacity level. For a very low price, no fishing takes place due to the 
cost. For a moderate fish price, more effort is attracted into fishing, more fish is caught and 
the fish population reduced. For a very high fish price, still more effort goes into fishing, but 
fewer fish are caught due to the depleted stock. Consequently, supply decreases with 
increased price when P > PMSY.   
 
Figure 1: The backward-bending supply curve in fisheries 






















𝑖 = (𝑃𝑛 − 𝑐
𝑖 − 𝑃(𝐻))ℎ𝑖,         (6) 
where 𝑃𝑛 denotes the final market price of processed fish, 𝑐
𝑖 is the average production cost 
per unit of processed fish, excluding the cost of raw fish, ℎ𝑖 is the amount of raw fish bought 
by the middleman i. The conversion of raw fish to processed fish is assumed to be 1.   
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Assuming n middlemen operating in the ex-vessel market, the total harvest bought in the ex-
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 indicates the market power for middleman i .  
For simplicity, we now assume that the middlemen have identical cost structures, i.e., 
𝑐𝑖 = 𝑐 for all 1,...,i n . Then 𝜇𝑖 will be similar for all the n equally sized middlemen, 𝜇𝑖 =






 .  (9) 
   The market power parameter is restricted as 0 ≤ 𝜇 ≤ 1. If 𝜇 = 0, the middlemen are 
perfect competitive. If 𝜇 = 1, there is only one monopsonistic middleman, whereas 
intermediate values of 𝜇 imply varying degrees of oligopsonistic competition.  
  With the above assumptions leading to Eq. (9), the ex-vessel price varies depending 
on the maximum affordable price that the middlemen can pay the fishermen, i.e., the final 
market price after deducting production costs, 𝑃𝑛 − 𝑐, the degree of market power of the 
middlemen, 𝜇, and the price elasticity of supply, .  
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Final market price change effects 
Ex-vessel price  
Based on the above theoretical model, we now focus on to what extent a final market price 
change is transmitted to the ex-vessel market. In this transmission, the role of market power 
of the middlemen is highlighted. 
Proposition 1 
1.1  An increase in the final market price implies an increase in the ex-vessel price, but the 
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= 1) under perfect competition 𝜇 = 0, and it is imperfect (
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑃𝑛
< 1) if competition is 
imperfect 0 < 𝜇 ≤ 1. 
1.3 Middlemen with market power will keep the ex-vessel price below the level that 
produces MSY (𝑃 < 𝑃𝑀𝑆𝑌). 
Proof: See Appendix A. 
Proposition 1.1 specifies the effect of the final market price and market power on the ex-
vessel price. It is clear that as the final market price increases, the ex-vessel price increases as 
well. However, this increase is hampered by the middlemen’s market power, and if the 
degree of market power is strong, a higher final market price will have less impact on the ex-
vessel price.  
Proposition 1.2 indicates that the proportionality of the ex-vessel price to the final 
market price depends on market power. When the middlemen remain competitive, i.e., when 
the middlemen have no market power, the final market price is transmitted perfectly to the 
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ex-vessel price. In other words, a shift in the final market price is entirely reflected in the ex-
vessel price. When the middlemen have market power, they are able to keep the price paid to 
the fishermen down, and thus the price transmission occurs imperfectly.   
Proposition 1.3 is based on the rule that no middlemen will lose from export if market 
power prevails. They tend to offer a smaller ex-vessel price P than the maximum affordable 
price, 𝑃𝑛 − 𝑐. This keeps the ex-vessel price below the level that induces MSY.  
 
Fish stocks  
We next consider the effects of the final market price on the fish stock. 
Proposition 2 
2.1 An increase in the final market price implies a higher exploitation pressure, but the 





























2 > 0 .  
2.2 The negative fish stock effect is greater when the middlemen are competitive than 










< 0  
2.3 Middlemen with market power will keep fish stocks above the level that produces MSY, 
while competing middlemen can deplete fish stocks below that of the MSY level: 
(𝑋 > 𝑋𝑀𝑆𝑌 𝑓𝑜𝑟  0 < 𝜇 ≤ 1 ;  𝑋 < 𝑋𝑀𝑆𝑌 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜇 = 0) 
 
Proof: See Appendix A.  
Proposition 2.1 yields the impact of the final market price and the degree of market power 
among the middlemen on the equilibrium fish stock in the open-access fishery. When the 
final market price goes up, the middlemen offer a higher ex-vessel price to the fishermen. 
This motivates the fishermen to impose more fishing effort to obtain higher profit, again 
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leading to a reduced fish stock. However, the market power has an offsetting influence. If 
imperfect competition exists, the reduction in fish abundance is smaller. As the degree of 
market power rises and the ex-vessel price falls, fishing is discouraged and the fish stock is 
preserved to a greater extent. This statement is also supported by Halsema and Withagen 
(2008).   
Proposition 2.2 compares changes in the fish stock from a shift in the final market 
price under competitive market conditions and non-competitive market conditions at the 
intermediary level. It is clear that the pressure on the fish stock will be greater under perfect 
than under imperfect competition. A middleman with market power is able to reduce fish 
extraction. This is because, within certain limits, middlemen can decide how much to pay for 
raw fish. They tend to prefer a low ex-vessel price to save costs. From the fishermen’s 
perspective, a low price discourages them from fishing, and some might stop fishing or even 
exit the fishery. Consequently, at equilibrium, a smaller fishing effort relieves pressure on the 
fish stocks.  
Proposition 2.3 indicates how middlemen with and without market power encourage, 
or discourage fishermen from preserving resources. When perfect competition prevails, there 
is a race for fish among the middlemen and they are willing to pay a higher price to the 
fishermen to obtain more raw fish. A higher ex-vessel price encourages fishermen to intensify 
the harvesting pressure, ultimately leading to overexploitation of the fish stock.  When the ex-
vessel price rises above the level that yields MSY, a further price increase no longer provides 
the middlemen a larger supply of fish. Under imperfect competition, few middlemen are in 
the market and determine the ex-vessel price. They will set the price such that 𝑃𝑛 − 𝑐 > 𝑃, 
indicating that the offered price always is below the price that keep the stock above that of 
MSYX .  
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Economic rent  
Generally, economic rent is any payment to a factor of production in excess of the cost 
needed to bring that factor into production. In classical economics, economic rent is any 
payment made (including imputed value) or benefit received for non-produced inputs. In 
neoclassical economics, it also includes income gained by beneficiaries of other contrived 
exclusivity, such as labour guilds and corruption. When considering natural resources, the 
current economic rent equals the value of capital service flows rendered by the natural 
resources or their share in the gross operating surplus; its value is given by the value of 
extraction. In other words, it consists of two components: resource rent and intra-marginal 
rent. Under open-access fisheries, the resource rent is normally dissipated through excessive 
levels of fishing effort (Gordon, 1954; Hardin, 1968; Munro and Scott, 1985; Homans and 
Wilen 1997, 2005). However, intra-marginal rent still accrues to vessels that are more cost 
efficient than marginal ones. In other words, intra-marginal rent exists whenever vessels are 
heterogeneous in terms of capital and labour (Copes, 1972; Coglan and Pascoe, 1999; Duy et 
al., 2012b; Flaaten, 2018).  
 
Fishermen’s rent  
The rent gained by the fishermen in the open-access fishery model, the intra-marginal rent, is 








when using the cost 
function Eq. (4) and the harvest function Eq. (2). Substituting H from Eq. (3) and P from Eq. 
(5), and rearranging somewhat, gives: 








.  (10) 
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Therefore, to what extent the harvesting sector obtains rent depends not only on the cost 
parameter 𝛾 , but also on catchability q and the stock size X, which in turn is influenced by 
fishermen’s price P, and the carrying capacity K and the intrinsic growth rate r.  
 
Middlemen’s rent  
























𝑖=1 .       (11) 
 
Total rent 
The total industry rent is found by summarizing Eqs. (10) and (11), which yields: 
𝜋 = 𝜋𝑓 + 𝜋𝑚 = (0.5 +
𝜇
𝜀











.     (12)
   
Proposition 3 
3.1 Although there is no economic rent for the competitive middlemen, the fishermen still 
gain a rent increase from a final market price increase; that is: 
𝜕𝜋𝑚
𝜕𝑃𝑛
= 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 
𝜕𝜋𝑓
𝜕𝑃𝑛
> 0  
3.2 The existence of middlemen with market power generates higher rents for both fishermen 
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3.3 Middlemen with market power can partly transfer some rent from the fishermen to 
themselves; that is, when the degree of market power is higher, the fishermen will receive less 
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Proof: See Appendix A. 
 
Proposition 3.1 shows that, in an overexploited fishery, the fishermen still gain more 
rent from a final market price increase, but the middlemen receive zero profit. High 
competition among the middlemen induce them to pay fishermen a higher price in order to 
purchase more fish. However, if the ex-vessel price becomes too high, some middlemen will 
sustain a loss and therefore leave the market; allowing the authors some reflections on the 
dynamics outside the equilibria. The same scenario also holds for the fishermen. In the early 
stage of overfishing, they stay in the market and continue fishing because they observe a 
relatively high price. Nevertheless, after a while, less fish is available and the harvest will 
eventually be reduced. Those fishermen who face a loss will stop fishing. However, the stock 
is not recovered to above that of the MSY level. The reason is that some cost efficient 
fishermen can stay and make profit even in the overexploited fishery.    
Proposition 3.2 captures the importance of imperfect competition among the 
middlemen. When this is the case, increased final marketprices will be translated into higher 
rent for both the fishermen and the middlemen. With imperfect competition, the middlemen 
can control the ex-vessel price below and the stock above the levels that provide MSY. Thus, 
the effect of the final market price on the total economic rent of the fishermen and the 
middlemen are always greater than zero. 
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While the presence of market power always promotes rent for the middlemen, it 
dissipates rent for the fishermen. Part of the fishermen’s rent will be transferred to the 
middlemen, and this is pointed out in proposition 3.3. If there is no market power among the 
middlemen, the rent of the fishermen will be determined entirely by the shift in the ex-vessel 
price which in turn is equal to the shift in the final market price. If market power exists, 
increasing market power implies that the importance of the final market price is tempered; the 
rent of the fishermen drops and more accrues to the middlemen. The middlemen can collect 
the rents for themselves by keeping the price paid to the fishermen below the level that 
provides MSY. The total rents of the industry will be increased and can even become higher 
than those in the perfect market. However, most of the profits are captured by the middlemen. 
 
Examples 
To illustrate how the theoretical result may fit to reality, we consider two examples from 
Vietnamese fisheries: (1) the anchovy supply chain, in which anchovy is harvested by inshore 
purse seine vessels and supplied to the domestic market; and (2) the skipjack tuna supply 
chain, in which the skipjack tuna is provided by offshore gillnet fisheries for the international 
market. The characteristics of middlemen are different in these two supply chains; while 
processors are the key middlemen who bring skipjack tuna to the international market the 
anchovy arrives to the domestic market mainly through traders.  
 
The anchovy supply chain  
The anchovy supply chain is presented in Figure 2. Typically, all harvest is sold to 
middlemen before being transferred to final consumers. Middlemen here are defined as 
processing companies and/or traders. The first type of traders are those purchasing the harvest 
from several small fishing vessels at sea and selling the fish to the second type of traders 
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operating on land. The latter provide fish for the processing companies and the domestic 
consumer market. The existence of the first type allows fishing vessels to stay at sea 
continuously for longer periods, thus, reducing fuel consumption and operating costs. The 
second type of traders normally have better equity financing than the first type, and can 
implement and negotiate larger transactions. These traders are usually better educated and 
qualified than fishermen and the first type of traders to deal with the many documents 











Figure 2: The anchovy supply chain in Vietnam 
Source: Own data. Note: The percentages express percentage of anchovy quantity transmitted 
along the chain. 
 
With varying domestic market price during the period 2005-2017, this example aims 
at illustrating what the estimated ex-vessel price, anchovy stock, and rent of the supply chain 
would be. Data includes actual ex-vessel prices and actual domestic market prices. These 
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previous studies on anchovy fisheries in Vietnam; Thi et al. (2007), Tan (2015) and Thuy and 
Flaaten (2013) (see Table 1).  
The estimation is achieved using numerical approaches. Particularly, we estimate the 
anchovy stock from Eq. (5), ex-vessel price from Eq. (8), and the rent from Eq. (10-12) (see 
details in Appendix B, Table B.1). The comparison between the actual prices and the 
estimated ones allows examination of the purchasing and market power of middlemen in the 
supply chain.  
Table 1: Parameters for illustration of the anchovy supply chain case, 2005–2017  
 
Parameter Unit Value Source 
K Tonnes 216,400 Thi et al. (2007) 
Thi et al. (2007) 
Thi et al. (2007)  
r  1.03 
q Tonnes per vessel year 0.69 
𝛾 Million VND/ton/year (1) 9.21 Thuy and Flaaten (2013) 
c Million VND/ton/year(2) 9.00 Tan (2015) 
 
Note: (1) The average cost of the years 2005, 2008, and 2011; (2) The average cost for the 
period 2010–2015 
The linkages between the domestic price and the ex-vessel price, the stock and the 
rent for the anchovy case are presented in Figures 3 and 4. Figures 3 a), c), d) show that with 
increasing domestic price, the ex-vessel price and the rent increase and the stock is reduced 
(as in Proposition 1.1, 2.1, and 3.1). Note that in the propositions the exogenous “final 
market” price changes, whereas in the anchovy case it is the “domestic market” price that is 
exogenous. The elasticity of supply is found to be negative for all the observed positive ex-
vessel prices, implying that 𝜇 must be equal to zero (based on Eq. (8)). Thus, there is neither 
oligopsonistic nor monopsonistic power for the middlemen and that the anchovy stock is 
being overexploited (based on Proposition 2.3). The occurring of overfishing in the anchovy 
fishery has been established also by Thi et al. (2007) and Thuy and Flaaten (2013). Thus, 
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middlemen gain no rent in this chain (based on Proposition 3). Furthermore, the estimated ex-
vessel price is rather close to the actual one, indicating that the results derived from the model 
fit with reality (Figure 3b).  
  
a)                                                                         b)  
  
     c)        d) 
Figure 3: Anchovy supply chain: a) Time path of actual domestic and estimated prices; 
a) Time path of actual and estimated ex-vessel prices; c) Time path of estimated stock; 
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Figure 4: Anchovy supply chain: Linkages between the domestic price and the ex-vessel 
price, the stock and the rent  
 
The skipjack tuna supply chain 
Like the anchovy supply chain, the skipjack tuna enters the final market through the 
contribution of two types of middlemen: processors and traders. However, traders in the 
offshore skipjack tuna fisheries are supplementary in linking the fishermen to the processing 
companies, to whom they sell almost all their fish. The supply chain of skipjack tuna is 











2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Year
Marginal changes of estimated ex-vessel prices over actual domestic prices
Marginal changes of estimated stock over actual domestic prices













Figure 5: The skipjack tuna supply chain in Vietnam 
Source: Duy et al. (2012a). Note: The percentages are of the skipjack tuna products 
transmitted along the chain. 
 
There are several products included in the skipjack tuna supply chain. However, only 
the fresh fillet tuna1 is included in this analysis. We explore the effects of its export price on 
the ex-vessel price, and the stock. The market structure is also tested to identify if middlemen 
has any power adjusting prices in the chain. However, due to lack of data, the harvest data is 
used to discuss possible effects only on the stock, and the effects on the rent are not 
considered. The data were gathered from different sources, and quarterly data for the period 
2009–2017 were used in the analysis.   
                                                          





























Figure 6 reveals that the ex-vessel price and the export price move quite closely up to 
2011. However, later, the export price moved upward, then fluctuated from 2014, whereas the 
ex-vessel price stayed more or less constant. This indicates an asymmetric price transmission 
from the export price to the ex-vessel price. Indeed, an imperfect market structure is expected 
in the skipjack tuna supply chain, since the number of middlemen is relatively small 
compared to the number of fishermen. The quality of the skipjack tuna deteriorates soon after 
harvest. Therefore, middlemen may have some degree of market power over fishermen when 
the fishing ground – shore distance and time often force fishermen to sell their catch quickly. 
Furthermore, many fishermen are bound by credit arrangements and reciprocal agreements 
with the middlemen, adding to the oligopsonistic power of the middlemen.  
 
Figure 6: Fresh fillet tuna supply chain: Quarterly export price and ex-vessel price 
2009–2017. 
Source: Own data 
 
Different techniques can be applied to examine price transmission in seafood 
commodity markets (Asche et al., 2002, 2007; Sapkota et al., 2015). The researcher’s choice 
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error correction model (ECM) is considered an appropriate specification for testing 
asymmetric price transmission. The ECM model employed is as follows:  
𝑑(𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡) = 𝑎0 + ∑ 𝑎1𝑖 𝑑(𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡−𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝑎2𝑗𝑑(𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑤,𝑡−𝑗)
𝑛
𝑗=1 + 𝛿𝑢𝑡−1 +  𝑡,  (13) 
where 𝑃𝑡−𝑖 and 𝑃𝑤,𝑡−𝑗 are the ex-vessel price and the export price of fresh fillet tuna at 
quarter t-i and t-j, respectively, and  n is the lag order of 𝑃𝑤 and 𝑃𝑡. Furthermore, 𝑑(𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡) and 
𝑑(𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑤,𝑡−𝑗) represent their changes, measured on a quarterly basis, and 𝑎0 is a constant term 
that capture transportation costs and quality differences. The estimated coefficient 
𝑎1𝑖 examines whether the ex-vessel prices from the past quarter(s) can have any impacts on 
that of the current period. The short-term price transmissions from 𝑃𝑤,𝑡−𝑗 to 𝑃𝑡  are measured 
by 𝑎2𝑗 . The transmission is either perfect or imperfect, depending on 𝑎2𝑗 = 1 or 0 < 𝑎2𝑗 < 1.  
𝑢𝑡−1 is an error term, which implies speed of adjustment to long-term equilibrium while 𝑡 is 
the residual (white noise).  
Table 2: OLS parameter estimates of ECM   
Variable Coefficient (standard error) 
𝑎0 1.26* (0.56) 
𝑑(𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡−1) -0.20 (0.18) 
𝑑(𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑤,𝑡−1) -0.20 (0.08) 
𝑢𝑡−1 -0.12* (0.06) 
𝑅2 0.24 
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.13 
Cointegration vector (1, -0.07) 
* Significant at the 5% level 
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The results of ECM model are given in Table 22. The variable 𝑑(𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑤,𝑡−1) is insignificant at 
the 5% level, meaning that there was no short-term causality between the export price of 
fresh fillet and ex-vessel price of skipjack tuna. The coefficient of 𝑢𝑡−1 is negative (-0.12) 
and significant. This shows that 12% of disequilibrium is corrected within one quarter for 
reaching a long-term equilibrium state. In other words, only 12% of the difference between 
long-term and short-term ex-vessel prices are adjusted within 3 months. More importantly, 
the estimated cointegration vector confirms that, given a 1% increase in the export price of 
the fresh fillet tuna, the ex-vessel price will increase by 0.07% in the long run; this implies 
that the export price leads the ex-vessel price, which is consistent with the fact that 
middlemen has a stronger position in negotiating prices. In short, market power prevails in 
the intermediary sector of the chain, and middlemen may abuse their market power to slow 
down an increase in ex-vessel price to reap their profit margin.  
An interesting question is then if the stock is above the level that produces the MSY 
as claimed in Proposition 2.3. In fact, this seems to be true for the skipjack tuna case. The 
total catch of tuna has been recorded to increase substantially during the period 2010-2017 
(Table 3). The figure is also evaluated as far below MSY (MARD, 2018). This indicates that 
tuna fishing is currently not overexploited and the stock is above that of the level that 
produces MSY.  
Table 3: Total tuna catch in Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone 2010-2017 
Unit: Metric tons 
Year Skipjack tuna Total tuna3 % skipjack tuna/total tuna 
2010 24,056       29,707  80.98 
2011 24,792        30,688  80.79 
                                                          
2 The condition tests (ADF test and Johansen cointegration test) were satisfied before implementing ECM 
model. The results are available upon the request.  
3 Includes skipjack tuna, yellowfin tuna and bigeye tuna 
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2012 43,626        49,314  88.47 
2013 55,391        62,204  89.05 
2014 60,274        66,889  90.11 
2015 61,009        70,866  86.09 
2016 93,561      105,538  88.65 
2017 86,295        95,944  89.94 
Source: MARD (2018) 
Recall, in short, the empirical results indicate that there is perfect competition among 
middlemen in the anchovy supply chain and that the anchovy stock is overexploited. In 
contrast, in the skipjack tuna supply chain, middlemen with their market power have 
contributed to keeping the stock above the MSY level.  
 
Discussion 
Our findings indicate that middlemen have the potential to contribute to resource 
sustainability, but are also part of the problem in the management of fisheries resources. They 
can partly offset overfishing caused by the open-access nature of the fishery, and they can 
assure that fishermen and middlemen share the rent increase when the final market price 
rises. At the same time, those with market power will take most of the rent.  
The market power of middlemen has a similar effect as a harvest tax imposed on the 
fishermen. The government could, alternatively, have levied this, or as an export tax. It is 
clear that the implementation of a harvest tax requires management costs that are not free. 
The middlemen, who exist as a consequence of the functioning of the market, contribute to 
conservation of the fish stocks, and the government does not have to pay any fee for that. 
From a management point of view, this can be seen as an advantage, since management costs 
can make up a considerable percentage of landed value (Wallis and Flaaten, 2003). 
Furthermore, introducing the correct harvest tax to the fishermen is challenging. One question 
to ask is who receives the rents and who pays the costs. When an industry generates 
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economic rent, there may be a race to capture the rent. In the bioeconomic models, it has 
usually been assumed that the rent accrues to the fishermen. However, rent could be captured 
by middlemen, as demonstrated above.   
A market with a few powerful middlemen can also have some efficiency 
disadvantages. Fish stocks may be excessively conserved and not utilized in a rational 
economic way. Equality wise, middlemen may exploit their power and take most of the rent 
to the detriment of fishermen. Welfare economic optimum will not be achieved, since in this 
scenario the rent mainly accrues to a few middlemen. It is obviously that there are still trade-
offs and difficult balancing problems and this needs to be addressed by the authorities. 
Managing a limited number of middlemen or processors is probably easier and less costly 
than managing a large number of fishermen. Therefore, letting middlemen operate the market 
and capture the rent; then taxing them may be a second-best policy to apply. This study 
confirms that positive rent can be generated in open-access fisheries as intra-marginal rent, 
due to the heterogeneous cost of vessels.  Both the number of vessels entering the fishery and 
their cost structure will determine the size of the rent. Fishermen stay in the fishery for the 
rent in relation to their opportunity costs that may include different types of social cost and 
their individual valuation of leisure time, and they stay in the fishery as long as the net benefit 
is positive. Of course, there may be dissimilarities between the short and long term. In the 
short term, it is sufficient that the vessels cover their operational costs, whereas in the long 
term vessels have to operate on a full-cost coverage basis. If the overall objective of the 
fisheries’ policy is rent maximization, including resource rent and intra-marginal rent, the 
optimal sustainable yield may in some cases become closer to the MSY (Copes, 1972; Béné 
et al., 2010). This can be achieved by establishing an intermediary sector, consisting of 
middlemen with a moderate degree of market power.  
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Different types of surplus can be generated in fisheries (Flaaten et al., 2017; Quaas et 
al., 2018). The economic rent computed above consists of resource rent, intra-marginal rent 
and producer surplus in the harvest and the processing industries. The surplus to input owners 
are not discussed in this study since we focus on developing countries where input owners 
normally are operating in small-scale and hardly have any market power. The same applies to 
the retail sector in developing countries. However, in high income developed countries 
increasing market power of the modern retail sector seems to be the case, but this is outside 
the scope of this study.   
The total cost function applied in this study is a simple polynomial function of degree 
two, which gives a linear marginal cost function. In fact, it could be generalized as a 
polynomial form with a degree greater than two, depending on how elastic the effort–cost 
relationship is. However, even though the mathematical results would be more complicated, 
the qualitative findings would in principle be the same.  
In the real world, seafood supply chains tend to be more complex. They involve 
numerous interlinked activities performed by multiple intermediary actors located in different 
regions of a country, or even in various countries around the globe. Thus, to bring the theory 
closer to the real world, the analysis of the effects of the final market price on the basic 
biological and economic factors of open-access fisheries in a developing country, could take 
into account the diverse intermediaries and the complex supply chain.  
 
Conclusion 
From an economic efficiency point of view for Vietnam, it would be beneficial to prioritize 
management measures in the anchovy fisheries rather than in the tuna fisheries. The issue of 
rent creation in open-access fisheries has not received much scholarly attention. Rather, it has 
generally been assumed that the economic rent will dwindle as an inevitable consequence of 
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the open-access characteristics. This study enriches the literature by addressing the possibility 
of positive rent in open access fisheries. It also identifies opportunities to enhance rent 
without overexploitation of fish stocks by organizing the intermediary market through 
middlemen with market power. Middlemen may play an important role and act as a 
functional equivalent to a harvest tax that help ensure resource conservation. However, unlike 
a harvest tax, which can be costly to implement, middlemen, as discussed above, operate as a 
constitutive part of the market. Nevertheless, too few middlemen is a problem when it comes 
to rent distribution to society. Even though middlemen can create more rents for the supply 
chain, these rents mainly benefit the middlemen. Hence, collecting tax from middlemen is 
important and could prove beneficial, since it is easier than including a large number of 
fishermen. The middlemen institution in the case of Vietnam, and probably also in many 
other countries, has developed through the functioning of the market without governmental 
participation. Letting middlemen operate the market, e.g. through licensing, and capture the 
rent -- then taxing them, could be a second-best policy to apply; however, this necessitates 
further research. 
 
Appendix A. Proof of propositions 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
 
To find the effect on the ex-vessel price of the final market price, we differentiate Eq. (10) 








   (A1) 
We now consider how the ex-vessel price changes when market power appears. This is done 













2.          (A2) 
With 𝜇 = 0, Eq. (A1) yields 
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑃𝑛
= 1 . 
With 0 < 𝜇 ≤ 1, a middleman with market power will tend to offer a price at which 𝑃𝑛 − 𝑐 >
𝑃. From this follows (1 +
𝜇
𝜀
) > 1 →
𝜇
𝜀
> 0 → > 0. This results in 
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𝜕𝑃𝑛







Thus, Eq. (A1) is always positive and Eq. (A2) is always negative; that is, satisfying 
Proposition 1.1.  
With 𝜇 = 0, Eq. (A1) 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑃𝑛
= 1; With 0 < 𝜇 ≤ 1, Eq. (A1) we find 
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑃𝑛
< 1.  
Hence, Proposition 1.2 is proved. 
A middleman with market power, 0 < 𝜇 ≤ 1, will tend to offer a price at which 𝑃𝑛 − 𝑐 > 𝑃. 
From this follows that > 0 → 𝑋 >
𝐾
𝑒
 or 𝑋 > 𝑋𝑀𝑆𝑌 or 𝑃 < 𝑃𝑀𝑆𝑌. If middlemen are 
competitive, 𝜇 = 0, then 𝑃𝑛 − 𝑐 = 𝑃 with ∀ . This condition is thus satisfied even if  < 0 
or  𝑃 > 𝑃𝑀𝑆𝑌. Proposition 1.3 is proved. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
 
To see how fish stocks will be affected by opening up for trade, we use Eq. (5) and 









< 0          (A3) 
Next, we multiply Eq. (A3) with Eq. (A1) in order to achieve the differential of fish stock 




















< 0.       (A4) 
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2 > 0.  
Hence, Proposition 2.1 is proved. 
To prove Proposition 2.2, we consider the effects on the stock of an increase in the final 
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Proposition 2.2 is proved. 
When 1 ≥ 𝜇 > 0 → 𝑃 < 𝑃𝑀𝑆𝑌 → 𝐸 < 𝐸𝑀𝑆𝑌 → 𝑋 > 𝑋𝑀𝑆𝑌; When 𝜇 = 0 → 𝑃 > 𝑃𝑀𝑆𝑌 → 𝐸 >
𝐸𝑀𝑆𝑌 → 𝑋 < 𝑋𝑀𝑆𝑌. Proposition 2.3 is proved. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
 
To prove Proposition 3.1, we first differentiate 𝜋𝑓 with respect to X in Eq. (11) to identify 
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> 0      (A6) 
Secondly, we consider how profit of the middlemen will be affected by opening up for trade. 














) < 0         (A7) 
The effect on profit of the middlemen as a result of final market price changes is found by 















































> 0 with ∀ > 0    (A8) 



















































> 0 with ∀ > 0        
Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 are proved.  
To show that the total rent of the supply chain are influenced by the degree of market power 
among middlemen, we differentiate Eq. (A6), Eq. (A8) and Eq. (A9) once more with respect 


















































































































































> 1      
Proposition 3.3 is proved. 
 
Appendix B.  
 
Table B.1: Anchovy supply chain: Summary of estimated domestic price, stock and rent 
𝑃𝑑
𝑎 𝑃𝑑
𝑒  𝑃𝑎 
 
















12.40 12.92 3.92 3,40 -0.23 43.30 26.58 0 26.58     
11.75 12.79 3.79 2,75 -0.22 44.63 25.59 0 25.59 1,00 -2,04 1,52 0,20 
11.10 12.66 3.66 2,10 -0.21 46.04 24.59 0 24.59 1,00 -2,16 1,53 0,20 
9.79 12.39 3.39 0,79 -0.19 49.31 22.46 0 22.46 1,00 -2,51 1,63 0,20 
9.14 12.26 3.26 0,14 -0.18 51.06 21.41 0 21.41 1,00 -2,68 1,60 0,20 
8.48 12.13 3.13 -0,52 -0.17 52.95 20.35 0 20.35 1,00 -2,90 1,63 0,20 
8.09 11.87 2.87 -0,91 -0.14 57.21 18.17 0 18.17 1,00 -10,79 5,51 0,66 
21.54 17.98 8.98 12,54 -0.40 20.55 56.90 0 56.90 1,00 -2,73 2,88 0,45 
25.70 22.05 13.05 16,70 -0.46 14.66 74.40 0 56.90 1,00 -1,41 4,20 0,98 
30.09 24.53 15.53 21,09 -0.48 12.52 83.37 0 74.40 1,00 -0,49 2,05 0,56 
26.79 23.47 14.47 17,79 -0.47 13.35 79.66 0 83.37 1,00 -0,25 1,13 0,32 
23.57 21.52 12.52 14,57 -0.45 15.22 72.34 0 79.66 1,00 -0,58 2,28 0,60 
21.00 20.60 11.60 12,00 -0.44 16.31 68.62 0 72.34 1,00 -0,42 1,45 0,36 
 
Note: 𝑃𝑑
𝑎 is actual domestic price; 𝑃𝑑
𝑒 is estimated domestic price; 𝑃𝑎 is actual ex-vessel 
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